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Abstract 
We have entered a new phase in the dialogue between proponents of evidence-based medicine and humanistic medicine. 
Over 30 years of parallel development of patient-centered and evidence-based care make possible concrete approaches to 
the integration of the fruits of these developments. Such integration is of increasing importance to the viability of today’s 
highly structured and regulated healthcare environment. Attempts at integrated model building on the part of proponents of 
both EBM and humanistic care have suffered from common deficiencies. These include the failure to distinguish between 
decision-making and practice models, failure to illuminate processes traversing categories of knowledge and information, 
failure to embrace the principles of relationship-centered care and failure to adequately address the epistemological issues 
inherent to the integration of the experiential and scientific domains of clinical practice. A published model-building attempt 
is used to illustrate what a correction of such limitations might look like. Efforts to develop person-centered care as an 
integrated and patient-centered vision of healthcare are encouraged. 
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“For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face 
to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even 
as also I am known”. 1 Corinthians 13:12, King James 
Bible. 
 
Twenty one years since the phrase “evidence based 
medicine” (EBM) was coined [1] and nearly as many years 
after a published manifesto unleashed a storm of 
controversy in the pages of peer reviewed journals [2,3], a 
discussion paper by Miles and Mezzich [4] heralds a new 
and much needed turn in the ensuing debate. They 
recognize that the erosion of humanism in tandem with 
technology-based advances in medical knowledge and 
intervention, as well as the economic impetus towards 
rigidly standardized care [5], corresponds to a long 
standing struggle within clinical medicine, a struggle that 
began long before the advent of EBM or the age of clinical 
trials. Whether one frames the challenge in terms of the 
dichotomy between the ‘science’ and the ‘art’ of medicine 
or between illness and disease, Miles and Mezzich’s 
scholarly and balanced review of the issues emerging from 
the “EBM wars” makes clear that those were never about 
winning. Rather, they forced long standing issues and 
challenges into the context of the information age and the 
trial era. Ultimately, the EBM wars have been about the 
challenge of integration, conceptual and practical, of 
domains otherwise defined by Western philosophy as 
inherently irreconcilable.  
Our perspective emerges from decades of practice in 
the high stakes clinical disciplines of emergency medicine 
and cardiac intensive care on two continents, combined 
with educational leadership privileged by close 
collaboration with some of the founders of EBM. This, 
enriched by studies of the philosophy of medicine as well 
as collaborations with leaders of medical humanism and 
narrative medicine, has led us to our current views 
regarding the trajectory defined by Miles and Mezzich. 
Their summary of the relevant historical developments 





within the literature on medical humanism, relational care 
and EBM is insightful and inspires little criticism or 
correction. Their prescription for ‘person’-centered 
medicine is compelling insofar as it reflects a decisive 
further step towards meaningful patient empowerment and 
a framework for integration.  
We will direct our commentary to several issues 
relevant to the challenge of integration. Specifically, 
referring to a review by Charles et al. [6] and drawing on a 
proposal for a casuistic model of decision-making earlier 
advanced by Tonelli [7], Miles and Mezzich propose a “5th 
reconstitution” of EBM. Charles et al. had identified a 
succession of 4 published attempts at model-building on 
the part of EBM advocates in response to early criticisms 
[6]. Although Miles and Mezzich emphasize features of 
Tonelli’s elaboration that seek to go beyond the 
representations reviewed by Charles et al., there remains 
nonetheless a subtle implication that the former is to be 
understood as a refinement of the latter. We find several 
aspects of Tonelli’s description of his casuistic model to be 
problematical in a fashion that is brought to the fore by 
Miles and Mezzich’s implied characterization. To 
elaborate this will require some preliminary consideration 
of published precedents for a workable model. 
 
 
From patient-centered to person-
centered care 
 
Miles and Mezzich’s pursuit of a conceptual model of 
person-centered care honors ‘person-hood’ over ‘patient-
hood’ and seeks integration without abandonment of the 
powerful tools and technologies afforded by medical 
science. In the course of their quest, they consider evolving 
concepts of the relational aspects of care which bear on 
clinical decision-making. Following their compelling 
summary, patient-centered care is a concept introduced 
over 50 years ago by Balint [8] and which has undergone 
transformations in interpretation as it has become more 
fashionable. Berwick’s interpretation [9], cited by Miles 
and Mezzich, is perhaps one of the most radical and 
reflects a strong commitment to the notion of the patient as 
a ‘customer-consumer’, with the practitioner virtually 
relegated to the role of technical consultant, advisor and 
‘customer care’ specialist. However, are there not 
differences between healthcare consumers and patients? 
Certainly, consumer advocacy and patient advocacy 
constitute distinct stakeholder groups on the level of 
sociomedical economics. The experience of illness, as 
opposed to the recognition of disease, furthermore defines 
the crucial difference between the practitioner and the 
patient perspective and between patient and consumer of 
healthcare [10]. Epstein and Street [11], also cited by Miles 
and Mezzich, concur with the concept of ‘patient-centered’ 
as a decentralization of power, away from the healthcare 
professional as the source of clinical authority and towards 
an empowerment of the patient. However, Epstein et al. 
also seek to preserve the special, relational features of the 
clinical encounter. A power relationship pertains to the 
situation of the patient-as-person. However, it is illness and 
healthcare needs that are vested with unique authority, not 
the practitioner or the healthcare system. As a result of 
this, the person-practitioner relationship takes on its special 
character and the ethical issues pertaining to that 
relationship assume their unique role.  
Miles and Mezzich recognize the concept of 
“relationship-centered care” as salient to their quest and to 
the evolution of the notion of ‘patient-centered’ care. The 
former was introduced in a 1994 Pew Commission report 
in a way that explicitly addressed the importance of 
relevant philosophy and epistemology [12]. The Pew 
authors, citing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
suggest that understanding the relational dimension of 
healthcare and practice requires moving beyond the 
dichotomized separation between objective knowledge and 
perception. They are aligned with the work of Engel in this 
respect, who they cite [13] and, implicitly, to the concepts 
of complexity theory elaborated by Maturana [14] and 
Varela [15], for which the writings of Merleau-Ponty 
constituted an immediate precedent. The Pew authors state: 
  
“The previously dominant paradigm of science has 
assumed that the observer is outside the phenomena 
being observed. The extension of this assumption in the 
health sciences - especially medicine - has been the 
notion that the physician can be a detached observer of 
the patient, whether acting as investigator or therapist. 
In the alternative paradigm, the observer stands within - 
and participates in - the observed phenomena. Living 
beings do not simply register sensory signals, but rather 
they interpret them. Perception is not a passive process. 
It always involves interpretation in the context of the 
observer’s mental set” [12].  
 
Their critique is therefore counter to the Cartesian 
dualism embedded in conventional understandings of 
disease [13,16]. As reviewed by Miles and Mezzich, the 
concept of relationship-centered care has continued to 
gather traction within the literature [17,18]. Summarizing 
our interpretation, the call for decentralization of power 
within the clinical relationship (“patient-centered care”) 
began to be heard 45 years ago. That transformation was 
extended through the evolution of the concept of “person-
centeredness” and the even more encompassing concept of 
“relationship-centered care”. Of these, the latter uniquely 
and explicitly challenges the conventional biomedical 
model and forces the epistemological issue which we 
perceive to be crucial to the achievement of the liberating 
integration sought by Miles and Mezzich as “person-
centered care”. It is through recognizing the primacy of the 
relationship to defining the nature of medical knowledge 
that we are forced to confront the enigma of 
dichotomization of the knower and the known. This 
confrontation is, in turn, central to addressing alternative 
representations of integrated practice. 
The literature on the relational nature of - and 
embedded power balance within - clinical experience and 
decision-making, spans half a century. EBM is a fledgling 
newcomer by comparison [2]! Was it much ado about 
nothing? Looking backwards 10 years after its 
announcement, Sehon et al. [19] concluded that, beyond 
bluster, what EBM offered was a prescription for judicious 
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use of research evidence to inform clinical decisions. Our 
historical review of the origins and development of EBM 
concurred [20]. EBM offered, objectively, a useful 
categorization of information from clinical research 
combined with streamlined and clinically oriented 
approaches to methodological evaluation and user-friendly 
electronic resources reflecting these categories and 
approaches. However, it would be short sighted to delimit 
the impact and importance of EBM to its objective content. 
Rather, the very process unleashed by EBM, including its 
over-reaching and uninformed assertions, was part of its 
product. Because it was tied to the explosive expansion of 
the clinical research enterprise and its bearing on 
healthcare [20] and because of the ‘viral’ speed of its 
uptake as a household buzzword within the world of 
medicine [21], the resulting debate, in tandem with 
concomitant developments in the epistemology of science 
and healthcare (including the advent of narrative medicine 
as a discipline) [22,23], has enabled progress not 
previously achievable. The social and economic crisis 




Representations of decision-making 
and clinical practice 
 
The sequence of 4 representations of clinical decision-
making reviewed by Charles et al. [6] and which Miles and 
Mezzich propose to transform via a “5th reconstitution”, 
did not grow out of engagement with the concepts of 
clinical relationship and interaction reviewed above, nor 
with concerns regarding the epistemology of practice. 
Rather, they represented perfunctory responses to the 
criticisms and dismay that greeted the official 
announcement of the birth of EBM [1,2]. We reviewed 
these representations in a critical review of the emergence 
and development of EBM [20]. Like Charles et al., we 
found them to be sketchy, ambiguous and unsatisfying as 
representations of clinical decision-making. Indeed, the 
Boolean constructions proposed by Haynes et al. [24] were 
not “models” at all. As observed by Charles and 
colleagues, they made no attempt to address the actual 
process through which clinical decisions are made. Rather, 
they depict categories of information upon which 
healthcare decision-makers are advised to draw. Figure 1 
contrasts the first two published Boolean forms [20]. 
Many elements of these figures are undefined, 
including the non-overlapping and partially overlapping 
areas within the respective circles. Do these areas imply 
that some decisions are made only on the basis of, for 
example, patient values and preferences? Or do they 
represent information corresponding to these categories 
that is not at play within a particular decision? Indeed, 
what is the content of any of these sets? Is it information, 
‘evidence’, knowledge? These weaknesses and ambiguities 
of the representational attempts on the part of EBM 
developers and advocates were appreciated and 
emphasized by Charles et al. [6] and also by Tonelli [7], 
who is particularly concerned with the nature of the 
included categories and the process connecting them. 
 
Figure 1 Two early versions of the Boolean 




The patient: missing in action 
 
In our 2009 discussion of ‘EBM model building’ [20], we 
perceived the issue of the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’ to be 
of paramount importance. In the earlier iteration (cf. left 
panel of Figure 1) [25], the issue was entirely ambiguous, 
with neither practitioner nor patient being explicitly 
represented. We perceived the principal clarification 
afforded by the later versions, including the right hand 
panel of Figure 1 [24], to be that the entire construction 
was presented from the perspective of the practitioner. The 
patient was nowhere to be found within either 
representation [20], nor in those that followed [6]. The 
‘research’ category was explicitly ‘evidence’ from clinical 
research, that is, ‘information’ [20]. The content of the 
other categories also appeared to be informational in 
nature. We therefore interpreted the Boolean 
representations of EBM to reflect a construct in which the 
practitioner is the sole proprietor and ultimate arbiter of 
decisions and actions, in the form of ‘recommendations’ to 
patients [20]. The practitioner receives ‘information’ 
regarding clinical evidence, patient values and preferences 
and clinical circumstances. These could be patient signs, 
symptoms and previously diagnosed conditions, as well as 
information regarding socioeconomic circumstances and 
available healthcare resources. Based on these 
informational inputs, the practitioner, through an 
undisclosed process, arrives at an appropriate decision. An 
active role of the patient is neither explicitly represented in 
any of the constructions, nor is it addressed in the 
accompanying texts [20]. In other words, there is no 
relational dimension within these representations. 
 
 







Where was the wisdom? 
 
The recognition that EBM, as elaborated in the literature 
published by its initiators and developers, resides within 
the domain of ‘information’, as opposed to those of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’, constituted the foundation of 
our earlier critique [20,26]. Such confinement precludes 
acknowledgement of the role of the tacit dimension [27]. 
The restriction of these representations to the workings of a 
single, conscious mind, that of the practitioner, dooms 
them to failure. Tonelli, who has contributed tremendously 
to fruitful and constructive debate on the issues at hand 
over the years [28-30], attempts to go beyond the vacancy 
of the Boolean constructions with respect to process [6]. 
His ‘casuistic’ model acknowledges such a process, guided 
by ethics. Furthermore, he acknowledges that it is 
problematic to reduce all relevant informants or ‘warrants’, 
such as his added category of pathophysiological 
understanding, to the status of ‘evidence’, that is, 
‘information’ [7]. Pathophysiological understanding 
reflects a deeper process which takes place on the 
boundary that separates information from knowledge [26]. 
Nonetheless, Tonelli’s construction ultimately fails to 
escape the one-dimensional context of the practitioner as 
processor of information: 
 
“The skilled clinician, then, must weigh these 
potentially conflicting warrants for action when dealing 
with the patient-at-hand, employing both practical and 
theoretical reasoning and comparing the patient with 
paradigmatic cases from both the literature and 
experience, before coming to a presumptive conclusion 
regarding the appropriate course of action” [6].  
 
Malterud appears to interpret these limitations of the 
casuistic model similarly [31]. Miles and Mezzich, despite 
their brilliant and meticulous survey of the development of 
concepts of clinical relationships across half a century, 
appear to underestimate the importance of these limitations 
of the Tonelli proposal insofar as they discuss it in the 
context of a call for a ‘5th reconstitution’ of EBM [4]. 
Figure 2 illustrates what a representation of the casuistic 
model or any such ‘reconstitution’ might look like. 
We emphasize that Tonelli himself did not propose 
such a representation. Indeed, we present it here simply to 
illustrate a potential pitfall of the attempt to interpret his 
casuistic model as a ‘5th reconstitution of EBM’. 
Interpreted in this fashion, the casuistic model has simply 
added an additional, fifth, category of input to a 
prescriptive statement regarding the basis for practitioner-
centered decision-making. In itself, this does not address 
the limitations shared by all of the earlier iterations as 
identified by Charles et al. [6]. Although it refers to and 
labels an underlying process, still centered on the 
practitioner as the principal protagonist, it does not fully 
illuminate that process. The fundamental flaw in an 
attempt to rescue the attempts on the part of EBM founders 
and advocates in this fashion is that it necessarily proceeds 
from an erroneous point of departure. The EBM 
‘paradigm’, precisely because it was never a paradigm at 
all [19], cannot be ‘fixed’. Rather, the direct value of EBM 
was to have advanced relevant information technologies 
and clinically-oriented evaluation, thereby contributing to 
the emergence of a context in which viable pathways can 
be defined and integrative solutions approached [19,20].  
 
Figure 2 A Boolean representation of the 
casuistic model of Tonelli [6]. Five categories of 
consideration inform decisions. The perspective 
is explicitly that of a practitioner. The process 
through which the five categories are 





Returning to Tonelli’s ‘casuistic’ model, as interpreted 
by Miles and Mezzich, we suggest that it needs not only 
additional categories of warrants for decisions, but an 
entirely different dimensionality, one that embodies the 
relationship-centered principle of clinical care. Figure 3 
portrays, in a very schematic fashion, what such a 
representation might begin to look like. 
We have hinted at an additional, important, limitation 
of the EBM representations and of attempts to somehow 
‘fix’ them. They are models of ‘decision-making’, not of 
clinical practice. This is a serious limitation and is 
extremely relevant to the quest for an integrated concept of 
person-centered practice, which we believe Miles and 
Mezzich to be seeking. Charles and Gafni have previously 
helped to clarify the distinction between decision-making 
models or modes of interaction and relational constructs 
[32,33]. Sometimes, the pursuit of patient equity within the 
decision-making process is reduced to a specific modality 
of interaction and participation. Shared decision-making 
(SDM) is one such modality [34] and has frequently been 
embraced by proponents of EBM as an answer to the need 
to incorporate patient values and preferences into practice 
choices [35]. More recently, SDM has been represented as 
a ‘pinnacle of patient-centered care’ [36]. 
We caution that, desirable as it is for patients to be 
encouraged to play an active role in their own healthcare, 
SDM is, in itself, easily reduced to the level of 
informational exchange between patient and practitioner 
[37]. Under such circumstances, the relational model may 
easily degenerate to the level of what has been called 
‘libertarian  paternalism’ [38]. It  was  such  unmindful 
hypocrisy,   based   upon   the   concept   of  a  practitioner- 
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Figure 3 A preliminary representation of a ‘relational transformation’ of the casuistic model. The 
perspective is explicitly consistent with a relationship-centered care construct. At least 2 
individuals, corresponding to patient and practitioner respectively, construct decisions drawing 
upon the 5 categories of consideration. The process through which the categories are integrated is 
still not elaborated. 
 
assumed ‘pact’ between themselves and their patients, that 
was attacked so scathingly by Foucalt [39]. 
If patients are to be included at all in a ‘model of 
practice’, they must be fully empowered, not merely 
‘respected’. This is the challenge posed by a truly patient-
centered, or ‘relationship-centered’, approach to practice. 
Poignant self-reported case histories highlight the fact that, 
under conditions of acute critical illness, the mode of 
decision-making for a single patient may undergo dramatic 
transformations, even when the patient is, under ordinary 
circumstances, inclined to a participative role in their care 
[40]. Hence, what is needed is an integrated model of 
clinical practice in the age of clinical research, not a 
formula for arriving at healthcare choices. 
 
 
Scientifically Informed Medical 
Practice and Learning [41]: an 
attempt at a model of practice 
 
We believe that a model of practice, to reflect a legitimate 
‘pact’ and to address the challenges of integration sought 
by Miles and Mezzich, must subordinate ‘clinical decision-
making’ to affiliated action [42] and enacted care. We have 
advanced the SIMPLE model as an attempt in such a 
direction [41,43] and re-visit it here (Figure 4) for the 
purpose of concretizing some of the foregoing principles. 
We propose that the “SIMPLE” figure constitutes a 
visual representation of an actual model of practice, in that 
all elements within it are directly interpretable in 
relationship to a global conception. The conception is 
hierarchical: the relational field, where clinical problems 
are recognized and defined and where decisions and 
actions are formulated and executed, is the domain of 
knowledge and wisdom, in the form of what Varela called 
‘enaction [15], what Aristotle called ethical action or 
‘phronesis’ and what Charon calls “affiliation’ [44]. The 
information literacy field, where ‘evidence-based 
medicine’ plays its useful role, is subordinate. The 
information within the lower field subsumes, but is not 
limited to, information from clinical research. A ‘fifth 
channel,’ emanating from the relational field, encompasses 
queries that cannot be reduced to the categories: ‘therapy’; 
‘diagnosis’; ‘prognosis’ and ‘harm’ and information needs 
that cannot be derived from clinical research. 
Transformation of information into knowledge begins in 
the ascending limb of the lower field, through integration 
with underlying and pre-existing knowledge, including 
pathophysiological understanding. This transformation 
continues with passage of the process back into the upper 
field. We would propose that this is where ‘knowledge 
translation’ takes place [45]. That is, it is here that 
knowledge generated and enriched through access to the 
world of information becomes relational and therefore 
actionable. Although based on objective observation, the 
information literacy field is not fixed in its content. 
Research ‘evidence’ does not determine practice; it is, 
rather, defined and subject to interpretation through a 
process that is generated within the relational field. 
Similarly, the relational field is not restricted to 
practitioner and patient; it includes all social and relational 
inputs to both patient and practitioner.  





The SIMPLE model conforms to a social constructivist 
epistemology and is consistent with complexity theory. We 
understand ‘social constructivism’ to be embodied in the 
pedagogical principles developed by Paulo Freire [27,46], 
not as a denial of the objectivity of disease [47]. These 
concepts have begun to pervade the medical literature to 
different degrees of fidelity [48,49] and are well developed 
in other disciplines [50]. We believe that they point the 
way to the kind of transformed medical model sought by 
writers such as Engle [13] and Malterud [16].   
 
Figure 4 Scientifically Informed Medical 
Practice and Learning [41,43]. A model of 
clinical practice integrates an explicitly 
relationship-centered construct with 
information literacy. The latter subsumes the 
principles of evidence based medicine. PACT is 
a complex tool of representation that defines 
categories of clinical action corresponding to 
therapy, diagnosis, prognosis and harm and 
facilitates knowledge exchange between tacit 
and explicit dimensions as suggested by 
Nonaka [50]. The model does not offer a 
formula for bringing different categories of 
knowledge and information to bear on 
healthcare decisions. Decisions and actions are 
constructed within the relational field. 
 
 
Originally published in Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 
(2011) 17:585-593. Reproduced with permission 
 
The SIMPLE model recognizes the tacit dimension of 
cognition, which we believe will please Malterud [51] and 
subsumes several important concepts borrowed from 
narrative medicine [42,44]. It is an outgrowth of an 
integrative effort undertaken with an important founder of 
that discipline [52]. At the heart of the figure, generating 
the dynamic pathway that traverses the 2 fields and also 
the domains of tacit and explicit knowledge, is the 
“PACT” construct. PACT is a complex tool of 
representation [42]. It allows differentiation and 
prioritization of clinical actions and facilitates construction 
of priorities between patient and practitioner. It also makes 
possible an efficient harnessing of research information in 
a way that coheres with those priorities. Clinical actions 
can be categorized as therapeutic, diagnostic, prognostic or 
related to harm from exposures, using definitions included 
within the construct. When a patient and practitioner 
address a healthcare problem of importance, these potential 
categories reside within the tacit dimension in the form of 
feeling states, concerns, anxieties, uncertainties. The 
concerns embedded in all 4 action categories are all at play 
at this stage. The patient may not yet be able to articulate 
whether she is primarily concerned about ‘what is wrong 
with me’, ‘what can be done about it’, ‘what is going to 
happen to me’ or ‘why is this happening to me’? The 
concerns and priorities will furthermore be different on the 
part of the practitioner. Both sets of inter-related concerns 
reflect the tacit role of ‘others’: family and friends for the 
patient; colleagues and institutional priorities for the 
practitioner. The ‘actions’ embedded within the PACT 
categories are primarily defined as relational, with a 
common stem consisting of “share consideration”. For 
example, within this framework, ‘prognosis’ is understood 
as a category of ‘action’. If there is no sharing, there is no 
“pact”. Practitioner responses, including references to the 
medical literature, may then follow a course entirely 
tangential to the actuality of patient concerns and needs.  
When we lead students through the PACT process in 
an explicit fashion, it takes on a form very analogous to 
that described by Levenstein et al. [53]. Patient and 
practitioner mappings of clinical action categories and 
corresponding priorities, are delineated in parallel in a 
fashion that generates discussion regarding the 2 
contrasting perspectives. The perspectives and priorities do 
not need to become identical for constructed action [48] or 
enaction [15], to emerge. Transformation from the tacit to 
the explicit domain naturally leads to the necessary degree 
of convergence. This process takes place in actual practice. 
Teaching approaches are developed from observations of 
the process. The PACT process follows narrative 
principles. It provides a framework that moves a 
practitioner from the phase of ‘attention’ to that of 
‘representation’ and is primarily relational, thereby 
facilitating what Charon means by ‘affiliation’ [42,44].  
Finally, the PACT system is not reductionist. Not all 
dimensions of experience that co-determine choices, 
decisions and actions are directly reducible to the PACT 
categories. Such dimensions include the patient’s 
experience of illness and the practitioner’s knowledge and 
experience of disease. However, the distillation of the 
experiential aspects of clinical interaction results, 
conveniently, in a form that is immediately transferable to 
the information field and to the design of clinical research 
within it. In this way, the useful tools that EBM has 
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brought us are efficiently harnessed with a minimum of 
distortion of the primary, relational, process. 
The SIMPLE model has a different mission from those 
reviewed by Charles et al. [6], as well as Tonelli’s 
casuistic model [7,54]. It does not attempt to propose a 
formula for deriving healthcare decisions from values, 
circumstances, research findings and other categories of 
information and knowledge. It is not to be considered a 
‘reconstitution of EBM’. It is, however, consistent with the 
concept of relationship-centered practice and the 
epistemological underpinnings of that formulation, a 
universe in which the knower and the known are no longer 
hopelessly dichotomized. In this regard - and we believe in 
the spirit of Miles and Mezzich’s quest for integrated, 
person-centered care - it attempts to put the elements 
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